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612 ESTATE OF BROAD [20 C. (2d) 
cial elections held to fill vacancies arising in terms occupied at 
the time of its passage would lead to arbitrary and capricious 
results. To cite one: If the special election here involved were 
to be held in the new enlarged district, the voters of the 46th 
Assembly District, which district has been added to the old 
17th Congressional District, would be accorded double repre-
sentation in the present Congress for they are already repre-
sented by the congressman from their old district in whose 
selection they had a voice. As already shown, such double rep-
resentation is improper. By the same token the voters of the 
46th Assembly District are not disenfranchised by restricting 
the special election to fill the vacancy to the old district for, as 
stated, they are already represented in this Congress. 
Weare satisfied, therefore, that the only practical and sound 
conclusion is that regardless of the repeal of the act (§ '117, 
Pol. Code) creating and delineating the old district, the spe-
cial election to fill the vacancy now existing should be held in 
the old district, thus retaining the same proportionate Con-
gressional representation under the old app'ortionment act 
and giving to the new apportionment act application to the 
selection of representatives for the Reventy-eighth and suc-
ceeding Congresses, as intended. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue forthwith upon the 
filing of this decision. 
[L. A. No. 17945. In Bank. July 29, 1942.] 
Estate of WILLIAM J. BROAD, Deceased. SECURITY. 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGELES (a Na. 
tional Banking Corporation), as Executor, etc., Peti. 
tioner and Respondent, v. WILLIA~ BROAD, Con. 
testant and Respondent; R. F. PIERCE et aI., 
Appellants. 
[la,lb] Wills-Estate or Amount Passing.-Undera bequest of 
"all money remaining in my estate after payment of my in. 
debtedness and the cost and expenses of administering my 
estate," construed with the remainder of the will, the legatee 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 361(1) j [2] Decedents' Es. 
tates, § 1067 j [3] Charities, § 16 j [4] Statutes., § 184. 
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was entitled to receive only the portion of eash on band at the 
date of the death of the testator which remainedaftcT the 
payment of indebtedness and the cost of administering the 
estate, exclusive of the expenses of maintaining the cstate 
during the period of administration. 
[2] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Appeal-Judgments Ap-
pealable.-A judgment on a petition for partial distribution 
and for interpretation of a will containing bequests to chari-
ties, which judgment determines to whom property is distrib~ 
utable, is appealable under Prob. Code, § 1240. 
[3a, 3b]Charities-Restrictions on Bequests-Excessive Bequeots. 
-Prob. Code, § 41, as amended in 1937, does not invalidate a be-
quest or devise to charitable uses contrary to its provisions. 
Where the· testator dying within 30 days after execution of the 
will does not leave any of the designated heirs, the testa-
mentary disposition remains unaffected. Where he leaves· any 
of such heirs, they take "if and to the extent that they would 
have taken said property as aforesaid," that is,if they would' 
otherwise have taken the property under the will or the lawlI 
of succession, and to the extent that they would otherwise 
have taken the property under the will or such laws. Hence, 
where a testator died within 30 days after executing a will 
~~ containing specific and residuary bequests contrary to Prob. 
Code, § 41, and he was survived by nephews and nieces, the 
property bequeathed to charitable uses· should be distributed 
to them in accord with the laws of succession. 
[4] Statutes-Interpretation-Presumptions-Intent to Chango 
Law.-A material change in the wording of a code section in-
dicates that the Legislature intended a change in the respects 
in which the previous language was amended. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino County interpreting a will and determining dis-
tributees of an estate. Frank A. Leonard, Judge. Affirmed. 
Duckworth, Mussell & King for Appellants. 
Fred A. Wilson and Walter J. Hartzell for Respondents. 
Garret W. McEnerney, as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of 
Respondents. 
[3] See 5 Cal. Jnr. 8. 
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614 ESTATE OF BRo-\D [20 C~ (2<1) 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment on a peti-
tion of the executor for the interpretation of the will of the 
decedent. 
The controversy involves the construction and application 
of section 41 of the Probate Code as amended in 1937 (Stats. 
1937, p. 1435). That section provides: "No estate, real or per-
mllal, may be hequeathed or devised to any charitable or be-
nevolent society or corporation, or to any person or persons in 
trust for charitable uses, by a testator who leaves a spouse, 
brother, sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor surviv-
ing him, who, under the will, or the laws of succession, would 
otherwise have taken the property so bequeathed or devised, 
unless the will was duly executed at least thirty days before 
the death of the testator. If so exeeuted at least thirty days 
before the death, such devices [sic] and legacies shall be valid, 
but they may not collectively exceed one-third of the testator's 
estate as against his spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece, de-
Rcendant or ancestor, who would otherwise, as aforesaid, have 
taken the excess over one-third, and if they do, a pro rata 
deduction from such devises and legacies shall be made so as 
to reduce the aggregate thereof to one-third of the estate. All 
property bequeathed or devised contrary to the provisions of 
this section shall go to the spouse, brother, sister, nephew, 
niece, descendant or ancestor of the testator, if and to the 
extent that they would have taken said property as aforesaid 
but for such devises or legacies; otherwise the testator's estate 
shall go in accordance with his will and such devises and 
legacies shall be unaffected. ' , 
William J. Broad executed his last will and testament on 
April 8, 1939. He died three days later. By his will he forgave 
to his friends, Arthur and Florence Brock, their indebtedness 
to him, with the exception of the sum of $6,000. The ~6,000 
owed by the Broeks he bequeathed in equal shares to Grace 
Methodist Church, Redlands, California, and David and Mar-
garet's Home, La Verne, California. He forgave his friends, 
R. F. and Alberta Pierce, the indebtedness owed by them and 
in addition bequeathed to them" all money remaining in my 
estate after payment of my indebtedness and the cost and 
expenses of administering my estate." 
The only other provision of the will which requires mention 
is the hClluest of "all of the rest, residue and remainder" of 
the estate in equal shares to twelve named legatees, including 
the Pierces, Grace Methodist Church of Redlands, David and 
July 19-1:2] ESTATE OF BROAD 
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Margaret's Home of LaVerne, and Volunteer~ of America. 
The dec0dent left no spouse, brother, sister, descendant or 
ancestor surviving him but didleave several nieces and rieph-
ews, none of whom was named in the will with the possible 
exception of Martha Broad Berry who was designated therein 
asa cousin: The appraised value of the estate was $28,331.49. 
After the expiration of six months from 'the first publication 
of notice to creditors the Security-First National Bank of Los 
Angeles, named in the will as executoi, filed a firstaccol.fnt 
current, together with a petition for partial distrib,ution and 
a petition lor interpretation of the will. R. F. and Alberta 
Pierce filed an answer to the petition for interpretation,and 
objections to the account and petition for distribution. 
William Broad, a nephew of the decedent, also filed an 
answer. 
By their answer the Pierces sought to have the court inter-
pret the will so as to authorize distribution to them of all 
moneys remaining at the time of final distribution, including 
all assets which could be converted into cash, after payment 
of specific bequests and costs of administration. 
The answer of William Broad set forth a claim of sole heir-
4~ ship as a nephew of the testator; that .as sole heir he would be 
entitled to have distributed to him the bequests and devises to 
the thrce charitable institutions, and that the Pierces would be 
entitled only to the portion of the money on hand at the date 
of death which remained after payment of indebtedness and 
the cost of administering the estate. After a hearing on the 
petition and answers the court found that the decedent leftas 
his heirs at hw three nephews and five nieces, descendants of 
a deceased brother and a deceased sister; that Grace Meth. 
-odist Church of Redlands, David and Margaret's Home of La 
Verne, and Volunteers of America were charitable institu~ 
tions within the meaning of section 41 of. the Probate Code 
and were not exempt from its provisions ( §42 Prob. Oode). 
The court. determined that by reason of the death of·· the 
decedent within thirty days after executing his will and the 
survival of .. the nieces and nephews,. the specific and. residuary 
bequests to the three named charitable institutions were in-
valid, and that the property thereby bequeathed should be 
distributed to the nicces and nephews in aecordance withthe 
laws of sp.ccession. [Ia] The court further concluded that the 
Pierces . were . entitled under. the. specific bequest· to receive 
onty the portion of cash on hand at the date of the death df 
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616 ESTATE OF BROAD [20 C. (2d) 
the testator which remained after the payment of indebted-
ness and the cost of administering the estate, exclusive of the 
expenses of maintaining the estate during the period of ad-
ministration. Judgnwnt was entered that the named nieces 
and nephews would be entitled to take in designated propor-
tions the property bequeathed to the charitable institutions, 
namely, the $6,000 owed by the Broeks and three-twelfths of 
the residue. 
The Pierces have appealed from the judgment. It is their 
contention that the charitable bequests should devolve to them 
under the specific bequest of moneys on hand; or that the 
$6,000 bequest should fall into the residue and become dis-
tributable to all the residuary legatees including themselves, 
with the exception of the charitable legatees, and that the 
portion of the residue otherwise distributable to the, charitable 
institutions should be distributed to the surviving heirs at 
law. 
[2] Preliminary toa discussion of the merits we note that 
the judgment was properly appealable as one determining the 
persons to whom distribution should be made (§ 1240, Prob. 
Code). The court and the parties treated the proceeding as 
one for that purpose. The qucstion raised by amicus curiae 
whether the judgment appealed from would be conclusive on 
persons not appearing or not represented in the proceedings, 
or whether such persons would be precluded on final distribu-
tion from asserting rights to a distributive share not in ac-
cordance with the court's adjudication, is not a question 
which need be determined on this appeal, especially in the ab-
sence of an objection by the appellants, and no such objection 
was made by them. [lb] There is no merit in the appellants' 
contention that the court erred in its conclusion that the leg-
acy of money was limited as ordered in the judgment. The 
language of the legacy provision, read and considered with 
the other provisions for specific and residuary bequests, fully 
supports the court's construction of the specific legacy. 
[3ll] The principal question for determination is the cor-
rectness of the court's interpretation and application of sec-
tion 41 of the Probate Code. That section was founded on 
former section 1313 of the Civil Code. As originally enacted 
section 1313 declared void any bequest or devise for charity 
contained in a will executed within thirty days of the testa-
tor's death, or any disposition to charity of more than one-
third of the estate by a testator leaving heirs at law. By ex-
4'-
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press provic;ion the property involved in any such void bequest 
went "to the residuary legatee, or devisee, next of kin or 
heirs according to law." In Estate of RusseZZ, 150 Cal. 604 
[89 Pac. 345], it was held that under that section and section 
1332 of the Civil Code (now § 126, Prob. Code), the property 
mentioned in such a void legacy passed to the residuary de-
visee ~d not to the heirs unless a contrary intention appeared 
in the will. 
In Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 689 [115 Pac. 242], it was 
stated that the legislative restriction' on bequests to charity 
was not intended as a mortmain statute or as declaratory of 
any public policy relative to charitable dispositions by will, 
but that its purpose was to protect the heirs at law against 
'hasty and improvident gifts by the testator of his entire estate: 
to charity' and to the exclusion of those who in the judgment 
of the Legislature had a better claim to his bounty. 
In 1933 the matter of the Estate of Garthwaite, 131 Cal. 
App. 321 [21 P. '(2d) 465], was decided. There the testatrix 
left no heirs. She executed a will within thirty days preceed-
ing her death whereby she left her entire estate in trust for 
charitable uses. The sole queStion was whether that disposi-
tion was void under section 1313 of the Civil Code (reenacted 
in 1931 as section 41 of the Probate Code). It was contended 
that since the testatrix left no heirs the bequests should be 
deemed valid. It was held, however, that the testamentary dis-
position was void under the plain language of the statute. In 
1937 the Legislature amended section 41 to read as first above 
quoted. Subsequently the matter of the Estate of Mautner, 
38 Cal. App. (2d) 521 [101 P. (2d) 520], was decided. The 
facts were similar to those involved in the Garthwaite case. In 
accordance with the amended statute an order distributing 
property to a charitable organization was affirmed. 
It is the contention of the appellants and of amicus curiae 
that the purpose of the 1937 amendment was only to obviate 
the result declared in the Garthwaite estate and to produce 
the result declared in the Mautner estate, namely, that when 
there is surviving no spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece, 
descendant, or ancestor, the restrictions of section 41 do not 
apply and the property should go in accordance with the will, 
but that when such heirs do survive, property bequeathed in 
excess of the restrictions passes into the residue by virtue of 
section 126 of the Probate Code and the decision in Estate of 
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'Y:Puld;,bc:>i-qaecordanee with the language as it read prior to 
t4e 'anlen'dlucnt of 1937, that 1111 dispositions contrary to the 
rpst;riciions \' shall be ,void and· go to the residuary legatees or ." 
devisees, or. heirs, according to law." ,The amended section 
do'es not invalidate the bequest or devise to charitable uses. It 
provides that. "all property bequeathed or devised '. contrary . 
to,the pro~islons oUhiS section shall go to the spouse,brother, 
siste~, ncphel\", niece, descendant or ancestor of the testator i~: 
and, to, the extent that they would have ta,ken .said property as 
a~9r,esaid'Jblli for I'luch devises. or legacit's; otherwL<:E) the tes~, 
tutor's' estate shall go in aecord:mce with his willimd such' 
4~;vise~ and,: legacies shall be unafi,ected. ~,'. . 
; [4] Suchn ID.'tterial ehange in the wording of thescction 
plainly in(~icates that the Legislature intended a change in 
th<; ,r,espt"ctsin which the previous l:mr.-nage ,,-as amended.', 
(People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 118 [255 Pac. 792, 52 A.L. 
~,811]i ~oew's Inc. v. IlyrcLm, 11 Cal. (2d) 746, 750 [82 P. 
(2d) 1].)' 13b] UndouuteJly the Legislature inte'ndedthe 
change to accord with thc result in the Mautner case, to the 
\}ffec~ that ,the teststmentary disposition should be unaffec~ed 
where",the testator did not leave any of the d'$ignated heirs. 
Also,in accord, with the obvious design to protect those heirs 
against "hasty and improvident gifts to charity" (Estate, or 
Dwyer, supra), t}{e Ledslature provided that property' be-
queathed or dcvisetl contrary to the restrictions "shall go to 
the !!lpou~e,", etc. ~'teaJling must be given to thf) lanb'1lal7e thus 
employed. It was plainly intended that in that event such 
heirs should take. How they should take is then stated: "if 
and to the e:-;:tent that they would have taken said property 
as aforesa~:d", that ~s: "if" they "would otherwise have 
taken' 'said. property" under the will or the laws of succes-
sion;" and ·"to the extent." that they "would otherwise have 
taken" said property "under the will or the laws of succes-
sion." With this inteIltion ,and purpose in mind we find no 
difficulty ill con~luding that the court was correct in determin-, 
ing that the' surviving heirs should take under the laws of 
s;qcee~s~Qn., . 
:':I'he,:judgment isaffirmcd. 
", ,-,; < 
Gibs,on,' C. J., Curtis, J."and Carter, J., concurred. 
. . , "' . ",,:". 
jf-, 
, TRAYNOR; J;-I dissent. The mnjority opinion assumes 
that the bequests' to the charitable institutions were .invalid 
4~ 
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'and that the problem resolves itselfifito dete~·m.IHit1giwhetiiei­
the heirs or thc residuary legatees shouldreceive',th~i propetty. 
There canbc no question, however, as towhbminicb:l)roperlt 
shall go until it is first d()termined~hethbr iM·; gift to .. the 
charities is invalid. Section 41 of theProb~t6 Cod~ 'as 
'amended iIi i937 provides as' follows: ":N 6 .~$tate; real'o1-
personal, may be bequeathed or' devised to ~ny' cl).814tabh;' br 
benevolent society or corporation, or to any per'soliot pcrso11S 
in trust for charitable uses, by a testator who leaves It spou.~c, 
brother, sister, nephew, niece, descendant 01' 'tn~~stor flUr-
riving him, who, under the will, or tlie laws of BuccessidIl', 
would otherwise have taken the properly so" beqtiea:thcd' or 
devised, unless the will was duly executeda.t leas(thirty day~ 
before the death of the testator. If so executed at least thirty 
days before death, such devices [si-cland legacies' shaU be 
valid, but they may not collectively exceed one-thitd.o£ the 
testator's estate as against his spouse, brother, sister;nephew, 
niece, descend.ant or ancestor, who would otherWise, ;A.S afore-
said, have taken the excess over one-third, and if they do; a 
pro rata deduction from such devises and legacies shnll' be 
made so as to reduce the aggregate thereof to o:he-thh~d 'of 
the estate. All property bequeathtld or d,evis~d contrarY to 
the provisions of this sectioll shall go to the spouse, brother, 
sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor of the teStator, 
if and to the extent that they would have taken said property 
as aforesaid but for such devises or legacies;. otherwise the 
testator's estate shall/!o ill accordance with'his will aild such 
devises and legacies shall be unaffected:" 
A bequest to chll.rity is invalid under thissectibn only i(in 
addition to the death of the testator within. thirty days' after 
the execution of the will, the testator leaves surviving him 
designated heirs, "who under the u-ill, or the laws of succes-
sion, would otherwise have taken the property so bequedhed/' 
The death of the testator within the thirty-day period 3lld 
the survival uf the designated heirs are not alune sufficirnt to 
invalidate the bl1quest. 'fhere remains the question uhether 
the naml'd heirs would "otherwise" have taken the propert7 
under the will, or the ]a,vs of succession "but ,for such devises 
or legacies." In other words, if the charitable bequests had 
not been madr, to whom would the property go under the 
will, or, if the will does not cover this contingency, to whom 
would the property go under the laws of succession? If ihe 
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descendant or ancestor the bequest to charity is invalid. If it 
would not go to any of these but to more remote kin or 
strangers to the blood it is valid. The property cannot go to 
the d('.signated heirs, and the charitable bequest is therefore 
valid if (a) the testator does not leave surviving him a 
nephcw, niece or nearer heir (Estate of Mautner, 38 Cal. 
App. (2d) 521 [101 P. (2d) 520]; see Estate of Garthwaite, 
131 Cal. App. 321 [21 P. (2d) 465] for the opposite rule 
before the 1937 amendment to section 41), or (b) if he has so 
framed his will that his nephews, nieces, or nearer heirs would 
not take what would otherwise be a defeat~d gift to charity. 
Under section 41 as it read before the 1937 amendment, a 
void charitable devise passed to the residuary devisee and 
not to the heirs, in the absence of a contrary provision in the 
will. (Estate of Russell, 150 CaL 604 [89 Pac. 345].) The 
1937 amendment to section 41 makes it plain that charitable 
bequests and devises are no longer to be sacrificed to the en-
richment of rcsiduary bequests or devises given to strangers 
to the blood or to heirs more remote than nephew and niece. 
That pnrpose is clearly set forth in section 41 as follows: "All 
property beqneathed or devised contrary to the provisions 
of this section shall go to the spouse, brother, sister, nephew, 
niece, descendant or ancestor of the testator, if and to the 
extent that thcy would have taken said property as aforesaid 
but for such devises or legacies; otherwise the testator's es-
tate shall go in accordance with his will and such devises and 
legacies shall be unaffected." The same result is accomplished 
by that portion of section 42 reading as follows: "Bequests 
and devises ... made by a testator leaving no spouse, brother, 
sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor surviving by 
whom the property so bequeathed or devised would have been 
taken if said property had not been so bequeathed or devised, 
are excepted from the restrictions of this article." If none of 
the dcsignated heirs can take the property, the restrictions on 
charitable bequests do not apply and the property goes in 
accordance with the testator's will. The very reasons there-
fore that exclude the heirs make a charitable bequest valid as 
against residuary legatees. 
In the present case the decedent left nieces and nephews 
surviving him. The validity of the charitable bequests there-
forc depends upon whether the property would go to such 
heirs but for those bequests. If the residuary bequest to the 
charities had not been made there would be an intestacy as 
to one-fourth of the residue and the nieces and nephews would 
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inherit that property under the laws of succession. That be-
quest therefore is invalid, and as property bequeathed con-
trary to the provisions of section 41, it must go to the nieces 
and nephcws. If the specific bequest had not been made the 
$6,000 would be included in the residue under Probate Code, 
section. 126, for it is not otherwise bequeathed by the testa-
tor's will. The will contains a residuary clause, which docs 
not include the nieces and nephews and they are not other-
wise provided for in the will. It is clear therefore that the 
nieces and nephews cannot take such property under the 
will. Had there been no residuary clause they would have 
taken under the laws of succession and the specific bequest 
would therefore have been invalid. Sinee there is a residuary 
clause, however, they can take under the laws of succession 
only to the extent that the residuary' bequests are not effec-
tive. The residuary clause left one-fourth of the residue to 
three charitable organizations, two of which were legatees 
of the $6,000 bequest. The residuary share of the charitable 
organization was therefore augmented by one-fourth of the 
$6,000 that would have gone to the other residuary legatees 
had thc bequcst to such organizations not been made. That 
4~ one-fourth cannot go to the other residuary legatees because 
it was not bequeathed to them. It cannot go to the charitable 
organizations because there are heirs who would have taken 
under the laws of succession had it not been bequeathed to 
the charity. One-fourth of the $6,000 should therefore go to 
the nieces and nephews under the express terms of section 
41 that "All property bequeathed or devised contrary to the 
provisions of this section shall go to the . . . nephew, niece 
... of the testator if and to the extent that they would have 
taken said property but for such devises or legacies." 
The remaining three-fourths of the $6,000 bequest is a 
valid gift to charity by reason of the following express terms 
of section 41: " ... otherwise the testator's estate shall go 
in accordance with his will and such . . . legacies shall be 
unaffected" and section 42: "Bequests . . . made by a tes-
tator leaving no ... nephew, niece . . . surviving by whom 
the property so bequeathed . . . would have been taken if 
said property had not becn so bequeathed ... are excepted 
from the restrictions of this article." 
It is immaterial that the charities may benefit by a re-
versal of the judgment although they are not appellants in 
" 
' 
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this proceeding. It the part of a judgment appealed .from, 
is 80 dependent upori the remainder . that it affects the whole, 
the appeal is from the entire' judgment, and the appellate 
court must do as justicc rel}u1r('.8. (Estate of Murphey, 7 CaL 
(2d),' ,712 [62 P. (2d) 374]; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360 
[125 Pac. 994, Arin. Cas. 1913E, 1319].) The present appeal 
carinotbe limited to the determination in favor of the heirs, 
£qr . that a6termination is dependent upon the holding that 
~~e gifts to charity nre void. Furthermore, p]'"oceedings to' 
determine to whOm distribution shall be made are in rom and 
~o jridgm()nt, in perso-nam is give~ in. favor of one party 
against another .. (Edlund v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.. 690' 
[289 Pac. 841]. Sec, also, 0 'Day v.S1tperior Oourt,18- Cal. 
(2d) 540' [116 P.(2d) 621]; Lilienkamp v, Superior Court, 
14 Cal. (2d) ~33 [93 P., (2d) 1008].) The objectof the pro-
ceedings is ~o ascertain the persons entitled to share in. the 
estate, and in the words of the Edlulld case, "It will not be 
questioned that justice" and' sound. policy require· that the 
estates of decedents be distributed to persons rightfully enti-
tled thereto. . . ." 
The judgment ohould be reversed. 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17819. In Bank. July 30, 1942.] 
TONY ALTRAMANO et aI., Respondents, v. W. W. SWAN 
et nl., Defendants; LILLIAN J. SWAN, et al., Appel-
lants. 
[1] Trusts-Establishmcn~Plcading-Conclusions. - An nllega-
tion that transfers from one to another were made in trust, that 
th" transferee now l.olds the property in trust for tho trans-
feror, an.l that the 9.Ctual, equitl1.ble and beneficial ownership of 
the property is in him sufficiently pleads an express trust for 
his benefit. 
[2]. Husband and Wife-Trusts-Resulting Trusts: Actions-Plead-
ing.-A constructivll trustdOtls not !trise upon the transfElr of 
[2] See 25 Cal. Jur. 193, 26 R. C. L. 1230. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 301; [2] Husband and Wife, 
§§ 176, 178; [3J Husband and Wife, § 178. 
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P;6perty from .~. husbnnd to :1 ~·ifo without :con:~idf1r,:iti6n. ;To 
nt:lte Ilcausl' of nction attacking II. transfer hy hu~bn:~d to 
wife upon the theory of a resulting trust, one'mu~tnilege 
c'ithElr that he intended to crcnten trust orthilt' he iritcl1dM 
th!tt thE' wife should not h!tvc the beneficial intercst}in the 
property. '., , . 
[3]' Id.--Trust&-.Actions-Evidence.-In an action bya' judgment 
crl:ditor to rtll'LCh allcged property of the debtor, findings thnt 
the debtor husband transferred propcrty to his wife Rlid d!l.1igh-
tcr in trust for his benefit wore not supported where tho evi-
dence did not disclose that he ovrned property which he trans-
fcrrud, but it appeared that she acquired It substantial amount 
of sep!tr:ltc property and thnt any deposit of his Harnings in 
her bank account or payment thereof on an automobile amounted 
at most to a comminglinl; of a small, amount of community prop-
erty with her separate property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Goodwin J. Knight, Jud~c. Reversed. 
Action by judgment creditors to impre.c;s lien of judgment on 
certain property as belonging to the judgment debtor. Judg-
4' ment for plaintiffs revcrsed. 
James B. Fredericks for Appellants. 
Frederick M. Kraft for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-The appcll:mts, Lillian J .. ' Swan and 
Juanita Swan Foreman, her daughter, were sued by t)1e jud?-
mcnt creditors of W. W .. Swan in an action to Ijlubject nn 
Oldsmobile automobile and certnin Postal Certificates to the 
payment of thc judgment. 
The' compbint contains five counts. In the first three of 
them, the respondents assert that W. W, Swan fraudulently 
transferred property owned by him to Lillilln J; S'\'ran, his 
wife, and Juanita Swan Foreman, his daughter. In thc fourth 
. count, the judgment creditors claim thnt W. W. Swan trims-
ferred the property in controversy to his wife and daughter 
in trw;t for hb benefit, and that he is the "actual, equitable 
and beneficial" owner of them. The fifth eoimt claims th,e 
right to relief upon a different theory; In Inakiiig the b'nris-
fers to his wife and daughter, say the rcsp'oudcnis,'Sw:m 
received no consideration," and by reaS()n thereof a cOnstrue-
.. 
